MarchettiI2

The role attention plays in building our subjective experiences

Giorgio Marchetti
University of Urbino (Italy)

Abstract: The phenomenon of qualia is explained by considering the organ of attention as the source of
the organism�s nervous energy (a kind of energy that directs all the other kinds of energy of the
organism), and attention as the nervous energy that gives the organism the possibility of performing
actions capable of directly affecting the state of its nervous energy. The attentional activity
performed by the organism involves a variation in the state of the nervous energy: it is precisely
this variation that constitutes the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.

In this paper I will try to answer to one of the fundamental questions concerning consciousness:
how is it possible to explain the phenomenon of qualia (cf. Chalmers, 1996), that is, the fact that
when we consciously perceive something, we have a subjective experience of that something? In
my opinion, an explanation can be found if we consider attention as a form of energy, namely the
nervous energy that feeds our organism, and the organ of attention as an organ that supplies this
energy. Until now, most models of attention describe it as something passive. The metaphors used
to describe it, whether a filter (Broadbent, 1958), a zoom lens (Eriksen and St. James, 1986), a
spotlight that moves (Tsal, 1983), a gate (Reeves and Sperling, 1986), or a selective, amplifying
channel (La Berge, 1995), imply all that it is seen as a privileged route for events to enter our mind
or consciousness, that is, as a kind of mechanism which, letting information come in and be
processed by some other device, plays a marginal, passive role. In such a way, the problem of
qualia is devolved to another organ, for example an operating system (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 1988),
a central processor (Umilt�, 1988) or a supervisory system (Shallice, 1988). I think that this way of
treating consciousness cannot provide an answer, because there cannot be a final device towards
which information flows, unless we are willing to consider this final device as a conscious agent
itself, or a homunculus, thus entering a vicious circle.

In my opinion, these difficulties arise when a pure information-processing conception of mind is
adopted, whereas a different approach should be assumed to face the problem of qualia. An
information-processing conception of the mind can certainly explain how information is processed,
the changes it undergoes, the time needed to process it, and so on. However, it does not and cannot
explain what a subject feels as it processes information, that is, how its conscious states start
forming, develop, and change as a consequence of what it does. This is because information is made
up of ready-made symbols representing the external world, whose meaning derives not so much
from the importance they have for the subject�s formation and development, but from the
importance they have for the researcher�s investigations. The information-processing approach, in
fact, is based on the assumption that the mind processes representations that already have their own
meaning, independently from the history of the subject, and does not investigate how they acquire a
meaning for the subject, and how the subject builds meaning1. The information-processing level of
analysis examines how some parts of a subject�s organism - sense organs, attention, memory,
central processor, an so on - transform information, but does not examine how a sentient subject
transforms itself as it processes information2.

In order to analyze a sentient subject, we must take a different, new perspective, let us call it a
"first-person perspective", which of course has to presuppose the subject�s existence. Such a subject
can be said to exist and be so when it can delimit and control itself, its operations, movements,
intentions, and actions, according to its sensations and to what it feels. This implies that it is able to
perform a kind of activity that gives it the possibility of directly knowing itself and defining its
limits. The direct experiences it has of itself contribute to form and constitute it: for instance, if it
tries to reach something unsuccessfully, the feeling it has gives it immediately the dimension of its
effort, and the boundaries of its body. We could say that the form it assumes is the outcome of the
activity that produces its experiences: the subject is the result of this activity. It is this activity that
gives it the possibility of existing as a subject, because only by performing it can the subject take a
form and differentiate itself from other subjects and objects. Therefore, describing what a subject
feels and experiences is describing this activity and its course.

How can this activity make a subject have experiences and feelings? I think that an explanation
can be found if we conceive of:

a) the subject as the outcome of a special kind of activity (let us call it attentional activity)
performed by an organism provided with a source of energy (let us call it nervous energy or
attentional energy) capable of directing all the other kinds of energy of the organism;

b) the attentional activity it performs as what makes its state of nervous energy change. This can
happen indirectly, through the action of the organism on the world, and the subsequent re-action
of the world on the organism, or directly, through the action of the organism on itself;

c) the experience it has as the change of its state of energy resulting from performing the
attentional activity.

This is a dynamic and active view of the subject, of course. It implies that the subject as such
emerges from its continuously performing the attentional activity, that is, from its continuously
using and applying its attentional energy; that every time the subject uses its attentional energy,
the action performed affects its source of energy, thus resulting in a possible change of the
state of the nervous energy; that the form the subject takes is a result of the way it applies its
attentional energy, that is, of the force with which it applies it and of the specific dimension
(whether physical - visual, tactile, muscular, etc. -, psychological, social, or else) to which it
applies it. In this view, a subject�s feelings and experiences are the direct result of its applying
and using its attentional energy. What it does changes its state of energy, thus immediately
affecting itself, its following actions and behavior.

I then assign attention an active role: following Ceccato�s proposal (1985, 1987), I consider the
organ of attention as the source of the organism�s nervous energy. Every time we direct our
attention towards an object, we spend our energy on it. At this point, a change in the state of energy
may occur, thus making us perceive or feel the object. Clear evidence of this can be found in
very common situations. When having certain sensations, our activity tends to be slowed down or
blocked: sensations of sorrow, pain, tiredness, depression, and so on, precisely consist in a
reduction of our general activity, as if they have absorbed our energies completely, or put an
obstacle in the way of our operating. Conversely, sensations of happiness, wellness, freshness, and
so on, consist in a positive stimulation of our activity, as if they have facilitated our operations, or
given us supplementary energy to continue moving and acting.

Following Paul Val�ry�s suggestion (1973)3, we can consider sensation as a variation of the state
of energy of a closed system. During the variation, the equilibrium of the system is broken, and
the organism has to spend some energy to reestablish the original conditions. The amount of energy
necessary for the organism to reestablish the equilibrium represents the quantitative aspect of the sensation.
Variation can be positive or negative, the former making the organism more active, the
latter more passive. In both cases, when the organism gets either to the upper threshold of its
capacity or to the lower one, it feels pain. Both an excessive activity requiring too much energy, and
a slowing down of activity hindering too much our energy, cause pain. An optimal condition of
working makes the organism feel well.

Sensations originating from different perceptual modalities differ qualitatively from each other.
A sensation of "hard" is qualitatively different from a sensation of "red"; sensations pertaining to
different perceptual modalities can usually be correlated and combined, but not confused. We can
account for this fact if we suppose that the organ of attention is divided in as many parts as the
perceptual modalities are. Evidence that, during the perceptual processing stage, attention can be
divided, up to a certain extent, between different perceptual modalities, seems to support this supposition.
Therefore, we can assume that if we pay attention to a specific perceptual modality, a specific area
of the organ of attention is stimulated, and a specific sensation arises. The specificity
of each area represents the qualitative aspect of sensation.

Summarizing, we can say that attention is not only responsible for the selective aspect of
consciousness, but also for its phenomenal quality. To explain the latter aspect, it is necessary to see
the organ of attention as the source of the organism�s nervous energy (a kind of energy that directs
all the other kinds of energy of the organism), and attention as the nervous energy that gives the
organism the possibility of performing actions capable of directly affecting the organism�s state of
nervous energy. The attentional activity performed by the organism involves a variation in the state
of the nervous energy. It is precisely this variation that constitutes the phenomenal aspect of
consciousness. When acting, the organism can experience and feel directly its actions and the
results of its actions, thus making possible the delimitation and emergence of the subject.

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1 A similar critique has been addressed to cognitive science by Searle (1980, 1984, 1992). The conception of the
mind as a computer and mental processes as computational has been criticized also by neurobiologists and
neuroscientists such as Edelman (1989), Reeke and Edelman (1995) and Freeman (1999) on the grounds that it cannot
account for the individual variability of the brain, and the continual modification of the patterns of neural activity and

2 For a similar view, see Freeman (1999).

3 Val�ry expresses his theory of sensation as follows (I translate from the Italian version): "Sensation does not consist so much in an introduction of something from the outside, as in an intervention, that is, an inner transformation (of energy) made possible by an external modification, a variation in a state of a closed system (�) sensation is due to some kind of disequilibrium (�) sensation is what occurs between two states of equilibrium" (Val�ry, 1988, pp. 411-412)

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