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JNLRMI Vol. II Nr. 1 February 2003
Exit Epiphenomenalism: The Demolition of a Refuge
by Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen*1 [Note:
Abstract
This article examines the background, implications and merit of
the position of epiphenomenalism. Most of all, the authors
systematically present an analytical argument against
epiphenomenalism, the argument from the justification of the
assertion
of the existence of consciousness. It is shown that
whereas epiphenomenalists claim to know that consciousness
exists, they implicitly deny the possibility of knowing
consciousness, since (according to their position) consciousness
cannot have any influence on our knowledge. Similarly, the authors
examine and reject the position of parallelism. Parallelism
implicitly states it knows of the existence of an unknowable
physical world. Consequences are mentioned for philosophy and empirical science. Introduction
In this article we ask ourselves whether epiphenomenalism is a
tenable position. Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that the mind or
consciousness in the Cartesian sense of subjective experience
(which comprises both perception and thought, and emotion and
volition) is an epiphenomenon of the brain and therefore
completely impotent. Firstly we will briefly situate
epiphenomenalism within the philosophy of mind. Furthermore we
will offer a sketch of its significance for contemporary philosophy
and for empirical science. Then we will also give attention to the
arguments that have been presented in favor of the position. In
the second part we will look at the arguments that through the
passage of time have been used against epiphenomenalism. In
this part we will also present an argument that we believe
demonstrates better than any other its internal inconsistency.
Finally, in the third part, we will ask ourselves what consequences
the disqualification of epiphenomenalism (as a tenable position)
should have, both for the philosophy of mind and for philosophy in general, as well as for the empirical sciences based on these. Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism holds that all mental phenomena, processes
or
conditions are nothing more than epiphenomena (by-products) of
cerebral processes. Hereby one does not intend to say that the
mental could not exist apart from the the physical (although this is
indeed implied by it), but that the mental does not have any
influence on reality. The subjective mind does exist, but it is not
"efficacious", i.e. it cannot be the cause of
anything, neither within
its own mental dominion, nor within the physical world *2. For this
supposed mental incapacity people have created illustrative
images, like that
of the steam whistle of a locomotive. The sound
of the steam whistle constitutes a real phenomenon, but it does
not influence the functioning of the loc, it is only an epiphenomenon
of
it *3. In a similar way, there are conscious experiences that are
inevitably caused by cerebral processes. Just as the steam
whistle does not influence the functioning of the locomotive,
neither
does consciousness influence the cerebral processes by which it is produced. Ontology and causality
Epiphenomenalism is an answer to the question of the causal
influence
of the mind or consciousness upon reality. The answer is
that the mind does not exercise any influence. The mind is always
only an effect and never a cause. As such, epiphenomenalism
may
be classified within so called physicalism. Physicalism states
that everything that exists is the result of the laws which are valid
for the physical world. It is important to make a sharp distinction
between physicalism and materialism. Materialism is an
ontological position that states that the only thing that really exists
is matter -traditionally: "atoms in motion". Physicalism is not
an
ontological position, but only speaks of the types of causality that
may exist. Also despite the possible existence of an uncountable
number of entities that never could be included in definitions of
matter, only the material entities can exercise a causal influence.
This leads to the conclusion that epiphenomenalism truly is
physicalist. However, it is not a reductionist materialist position because the
very reason that is given for the incapacity of consciousness
consists of the fact that consciousness is not material. Thus,
epiphenomenalism is a dualist physicalist position *4. There also
are other forms of physicalism, which do have a materialist
character. Thus, an identity theory cannot recognize either that the
subjective mind as such would be efficacious, because conscious
life following this thesis is in the objective sense identical to certain
physiological events in the brain, and therefore the subjective
properties don't matter causally in the objective sense. On the
other hand, the eliminationist positions naturally deny any influence
by the mind, for the simple reason that according to them the mind
does not even exist. Within the philosophy of mind,
epiphenomenalism is frequently used as though it were a synonym
of physicalism. For this reason the identity theory is frequently
called "epiphenomenalist" as well. This kind of confusion does
not
facilitate the debate over epiphenomenalism. Some of the
arguments defended are either against or in favor of certain
other kinds of physicalism. It is for this reason that we stress
again that epiphenomenalism has a dualist ontology. It is this
ontology that following the physical principle leads to the
conclusion that there is indeed a mental life, but that that mental life does not exert any influence upon reality. Dualism and psychogenic causality
Epiphenomenalism is one of the answers that dualists give to the
question of psychogenical causality: the influence of mind on
reality. It is the only completely physicalist answer within dualism.
There are also two other dualist positions concerning this
question. On the one hand we can find parallelism, that maintains
a partial physicalism. According to parallelism the mind does
exert causal influence upon its own mental reality, but not upon
physical reality. As in the case of physicalism, the material world
would be completely determined by physical laws. An important
difference, however, is that the material world does not influence
the mind either. There would be a complete parallel causality
between the two kinds of domain of reality. On the other hand
there is interactionism, which also rejects physicalism within the
material world. Following interactionism matter and mind both exert a causal influence upon themselves and on each other. Implications of epiphenomenalism
In the philosophical sense, the major implication of
epiphenomenalism is that what we do or feel is never caused by
what we experience or have experienced. This implication goes
much further than the negation of free will. As subjective beings,
we are completely impotent confronted by the processes of the
material world. We cannot exert any influence upon them, but we
are completely determined by them. Our relations with reality, our
relation with ourselves, with other persons, with objects, etc., are
completely caused by physiological processes in the brain.
Such relations never initiate anything. Thus, epiphenomenalism
anthropologically implies an "imprisoned" consciousness that
can
undertake absolutely nothing and never has any power over itself.
Naturally, this metaphysics has great consequences for the
axiology and ethics. In fact, axiologically epiphenomenalism
implies that all our values are biogenical; there are no values that
would not be epiphenomena of neurological processes.
Anything
that we human beings experience as transcendent to the
purely biological, such as beauty, truth, or friendship, is in fact
nothing more than the impotent product of physiology which is
exempt
of any value. This approaches a nihilist axiology. Why for
example do many people find a certain opus of Beethoven
moving?
Exclusively because their brains react in a specific way (causing
emotions) to a certain auditive structure and because that physical
reaction causes a certain positive subjective sensation, and never
because of the qualitative experience of beauty itself. In the field
of ethics not only do such concepts as responsibility lose their
meaning, but any ethical ideal should be seen as exclusively
caused by cerebral processes. The only kind of ethics that might
be reconciled with this, is a strictly descriptive naturalism. In other
words, the moral domain is completely determined by amoral
neurology.
In psychology, epiphenomenalism implies that everything which is
relevant for behaviour and cognition can in principle be completely
simulated by machines (computers). The same goes for animal
psychology and ethology: if human consciousness does not exert
any influence, then the same must naturally hold for animal
consciousness *5.
With regards to neuropsychology and psychiatry
epiphenomenalism
agrees with the thought that they should be
completely determined by biology. In the case of psychiatric
disorders it is therefore always essential to emphasize physiology
(biopsychiatry).
Finally, parapsychology *6 which studies paranormal phenomena
which occur under experimental conditions, is hardly conceivable
given the presuppositions of epiphenomenalism. Various
parapsychologists consider their investigations as a possibility to
evaluate the hypothesis of direct interactions between mind and
physical reality, i.e.: investigations that aim at extrasensory
perception, and at psychokinesis, by which the mind would exert influence outside its physical motor apparatus *7. Arguments in favor of epiphenomenalism
To opt for the
epiphenomenalist position is not an arbitrary choice.
In fact it consists, as has already been said, of a combination of
dualism and physicalism. With the dualist element,
epiphenomenalism avoids the objection against materialism that it
would deny the existence of consciousness which it itself would
need as a philosophical current, or which would reduce
consciousness to something material and therefore to something
unconscious *8.
For the remainder of this article, our attention will be directed
towards the physicalist aspect of epiphenomenalism, not to its
dualist ontology, which is shared by us *9. Therefore, this essay
will explicitly not deal with any form of materialism, because -just
like the epiphenomenalists and other dualists- we think it is evident
that there are aspects of the subjective mind which a priori cannot
be considered material in any way. In other words, the ontological
debate should therefore be taking place before the debate about
causal efficacy, not during, let alone afterwards. The mingling of
these two questions that clearly differ from each other has
already caused a lot of confusion. Although such may be very
unpopular, we won't follow then the materialist fashion and we will
only deal here with the problem of efficacy within a dualist context.
Epiphenomenalists present the following argumentation for their
physicalism: 1. From a theoretical point of view, it is more
parsimonious to adopt the physicalist position, because a) the
physical laws are as far as we know valid for all types of physical
organization, including the human organism and its brain *10. b)
there is not a single empirical bit of evidence for a psychogenic
effect on reality *11. 2. Interactionism is "inconceivable". It
would
boil down to "magic", as Jackendoff puts it *12. How could
something mental cause something material? This second point
we will leave aside immediately. If we cannot conceive of a
psychogenic influence, then the somatogenic causation of the
psyche is even more inconceivable, and it is on such "magical"
causation that epiphenomenalism is explicitly based. We may add
that any causality is essentially mysterious *13. In what follows,
we will only consider acceptable the argument from parsimony.
The principle of parsimony is important within the philosophy of
science because it can lessen all kinds of unfounded speculations. Arguments against epiphenomenalism
After our exposition of epiphenomenalism, it is about time we
consider
the counter-arguments. By the way, according to Hodges
and Lachs *14, philosophers have attacked epiphenomenalism
more often than that they have defended it. One can imagine their
motivation
quite easily, if we look at the hardly attractive
implications of that position for all kinds of fields.
Within the counter-arguments presented we can distinguish
between four types: intuitive objections, arguments against the
parsimony of epiphenomenalism, an argument against the validity
of the position, and finally logical arguments directed against the
internal consistency (coherence) of epiphenomenalism.
First we will discuss the arguments presented that we know and then we will present our own analytical argument. Intuitive objections
The intuitive objections *15 against epiphenomenalism are
obvious. Epiphenomenalism does not harmonize at all with the
image an average person cherishes of him- or herself. For
common people it is evident that if they shout
sometimes, it may
be because they feel angry, or that if they smile to someone, it is
because they feel sympathy towards that person, etc. *16
Epiphenomenalism goes against this intuitive concept of the
existence of psychogenical causality. It would 'debunk' it, as it
were, in the following sense: "People may believe that their
conscious experiences matter causally, but they're just wrong, it
only appears to be so. In fact, only cerebral processes and
structures can have a causal impact on reality" *17. The intuitive
argument that our daily speech would show innumerable examples
of the importance of consciousness, is, of course, equally weak;
in other words, language reflects such ideas as are conceived of
by (common) people, and those ideas can, as has already been
said, be completely erroneous. We do share the intuitive
objections mentioned, but we are aware that in debates concerning epiphenomenalism they are not of much weight. Arguments regarding parsimony
Among the arguments regarding parsimony one can make a
subdivision between arguments that go against the
epiphenomenalist's argument 1(a) and an argument against 1(b),
both mentioned above. That is, against the universality of the laws
of physics, and against the lack of empirical evidence for
psychogenical causality.
Arguments against the universality
of the laws of physics:
Argument based on evolution theory
The evolutionary argument was already entertained by William
James *18 and
recently it has been defended once more by Karl
Popper *19. According to William James, the properties of
consciousness indicate its causal efficacy. First of all
consciousness probably becomes more complex and intense in
the course of animal evolution. In this sense it is similar to a
physical organ. Secondly, consciousness would be a kind of
"selective agency", an instrument to make decisions with.
Thirdly,
the nervous systems which get more complex at every stage of
evolution, do not only seem to adapt better every time, and to get
more flexible each time, but also they seem to get more unstable
with every evolutionary step.
It is for this reason, that consciousness would have originated,
following James, as it makes choices, and thus prevents the brain
from being lost in chaos. This is due among other reasons to the
fact that only consciousness has something to choose, 'matters
has no ideals to pursue'. Thus consciousness raises the
probability of the maintenance of biological life. On this point,
James reasons as follows: This plausible image offers a
justification of the existence of consciousness. If consciousness
does not matter, why would it ever have originated during
evolution? Karl Popper formulates it as follows: 'If natural
selection is to account for the emergence of the World 2 of
subjective
or mental experiences, the theory must explain the
manner in which the evolution of World 2 (and of World 3)
systematically provides us with instruments for survival" *20.
Now, the problem with the evolutionary argument is that
its
proponents don't realize enough that not all individual parts of an
organism need to be functional from the point of view of evolution
theory *21. A bear may for example have a
thick and warm skin
which is also very heavy. The warmth of the skin contributes to
the bear's survival, but the weight does not. The weight is an
inevitable epiphenomenon of the fact that the skin is thick and
warm. Thus it is well conceivable that something inevitably
originates as a consequence of a certain organization of genes
without it having any importance for evolution itself. Therefore, it is
incorrect to sustain that epiphenomenalism would inevitably
contradict (neo)darwinism. It is not necessary for consciousness
to have a positive effect in order to be conserved as a possible
effect of evolution, but exclusively that it would not affect the
probability of survival and reproduction in a negative way. This is
precisely what is the case according to
epiphenomenalism:
Consciousness does not have any impact on anything, neither
positive nor negative. With regards to James's argument *22 of
the "selective agent" that consciousness would be: this is
explicitly
attacked by Ray Jackendoff. In reality, Jackendoff holds, it is a
subconscious, 'computational' process of concentration and
selection of certain information, that would in many cases
effectively lead to experiences of conscious attention. The real
selection and choice would thus take place at a subconscious
level, not based on subconscious objectives and motives, but on
its hypothetical subconscious "substrates" (= the hypothetical
physiological structures underlying them).
Implication of teleology
Another
argument supplied by William James, states that in cases
of cerebral lesions certain functions can be suppressed and that
afterwards they apparently can be transferred to other parts of
the
brain, which might indicate an efficacy that only can be related
to consciousness. The problem with this argument is that it might
be the case in fact that it should be explained by a kind of
pre-wiring
of the brain that would allow several parts to adopt
several programs. There is no reason why it should be
consciousness that would cause the transfer of functions, but it
could be just the interactions
between the demands that life
imposes on the organism and the physiological possibilities of
which it still disposes. The supposed teleology might in theory be
just apparent.
Argument against the lack of
empirical evidence for psychogenic
causality:
Parapsychological data
John Beloff *23 is the main opponent of epiphenomenalism who
founds his case on paranormal or PSI phenomena, viz.
extrasensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK). Beloff
believes that only PSI phenomena can demonstrate the efficacy of
the
mind. He explicitly rejects all the other types of argumentation.
This attitude can be compared to that of Ray Jackendoff who
holds that he could only be convinced by empirical data that his
position is incorrect. Jackendoff does not say, however, what kind
of phenomena these data would entail *24.
Since in his view only PSI phenomena might refute
epiphenomenalism, Beloff considers parapsychology as one of the
most important means of regaining our dignity and awareness of
our human worth. He holds also that there are valid reasons to
suppose that PSI phenomena really do exist. Furthermore, he
states that PSI phenomena can be explained most easily by forms
of psychogenic causality. Not only there is no evidence
whatsoever that the brain might have completely unknown powers
that might result in PSI phenomena. But also, he is convinced that
PSI phenomena would show the same intentional activities as the
ones studied by common psychology. Although it is conceivable
that PSI phenomena are caused by something completely
different from both mind and brain *25, this is not at all a plausible
hypothesis.
Alfred Ayer *26 states that epiphenomenalism is defined
in such a
way that it would never be possible to refute it. In our opinion,
however, PSI phenomena might be considered as phenomena,
the physicalist explanation of which approaches zero to such
degree, that the pretension of parsimony loses its power *27.
Also, we think that parapsychology has sufficiently demonstrated
that the existence of PSI is plausible. When philosophers such as
William James *28, Gerard Heymans*29, Henri Bergson *30, and
H.H. Price *31 included these phenomena in their philosophy of
mind, the data were still more controversial than they are today.
In the meantime, the evidence for the incidence of these
phenomena is of such quality that some publications about them
are accepted by journals of science *32 and also for example by
the eminent American Association for the Advancement of
Science.
Some renowned physicists seem to be inclined not to reduce the
phenomena to autonomous physical processes,
and they even
include them within models that show interactionist properties *33.
It might be emotionally difficult to seriously accept the existence of
PSI phenomena, but
at the end of the twentieth century this
should not be an obstacle anymore to the right assessment of the abundant evidence in this field. Argument against the validity of epiphenomenalism
This argument was also presented by Karl Popper *34. He holds
that if a reasoning is really only realized on a physiological level,
the epiphenomenalist cannot maintain the validity of his or her own
position. The possible validity of epiphenomenalism is not a
physical property but should be seen as a positive judgment on
the position based on abstract principles. Popper does not
consider this point as a refutation of epiphenomenalism, but he
does conclude that the epiphenomenalist cannot use any
argument to defend him- or herself, as that would imply the
recognition of the impact of immaterial principles. We agree with
this argument of Popper. If the epiphenomenalist states that in the
real world the only things that matter are physical entities, why
does (s)he bother then about such things as "truth" and
"validity"?
Arguments against the internal consistency of epiphenomenalism
Several arguments have been formulated according to which
epiphenomenalism contradicts itself. All of these arguments are
structured as follows:
Epiphenomenalism does itself mention consciousness, while
denying for example its efficacy. This implies that consciousness
in one way or another has had an effect upon epiphenomenalism's
argumentation and upon the ideas on which it is based.
The argument from the knowledge of
contents of consciousness
The crudest form of the argument mentioned above states the
following: Some epiphenomenalists are talking about all kinds of
contents of consciousness, such as for example the experience of
colours or sounds, and they hold at the same time that none of
these contents would have any impact on reality. How is it
possible then that those very same epiphenomenalists talk about
contents of consciousness?
This version of the argument, however, can still be refuted by
epiphenomenalism. While talking about the contents of
consciousness, one
does not have to be talking, according to
epiphenomenalism, about the contents themselves, but in fact only
about the specific physiological substrates that constitute the
supposed cause of any kind of
subjective experiences *35. A
proposition such as 'I see the color red' would thus be caused
completely by the supposed physiological correlate of the content
of the consciousness concerned. That there would
be such
physiological substrates for any conscious content that exists, is a
basic principle of epiphenomenalism: All subjective experiences
would be caused by cerebral structures or processes *36.
The argument from
the origin of the
concept of consciousness
Where did our concepts regarding subjective experiences come
from? This is the question which is raised by the second version of
the logical argument. S. Shoemaker holds that it is qualia which
are the cause of the existence of a belief in the existence of
qualia. Following Shoemaker *37, one could maintain that people
would think, talk and write about the concept of consciousness
because they have formed this concept on the basis of
consciousness.
Thus
formulated, the argument is still not strong enough *38. First,
according to the epiphenomenalists one could still well imagine a
conceptual representation of consciousness within a system that
does not possess any consciousness itself, but only an innate
concept of consciousness. Secondly, talking about consciousness
does not in itself prove anything regarding the presence of such
consciousness,
because one could also program a computer in
such a way that it would produce verbal output about the concept
of consciousness.
The argument from wondering about
consciousness
Elitzur *39 states that consciousness does not have to be the
cause of a concept of consciousness, but it does have to be the
cause of the fact that "people are bothered by problems of
consciousness". However, if it is possible that there is an innate
concept of consciousness, which is not excluded by Elitzur, then
the emotional interest concerning the strange concept of
consciousness could be explained away as a subjective
epiphenomenon of a purely physiological phenomenon.
Physiological substrates of wondering about the supposedly
innate concept of consciousness would lead to an experience of
wonder and interest.
The argument from the justification of the concept of
consciousness
We ourselves know three authors that completely independently
from us have reached the following version of the logical argument
against epiphenomenalism, they are: Michael Watkins, Dennett*40
and John Foster*41.
Reacting to an essay by Jackson of 1982 *42, Michael Watkins
wrote a short article in the journal 'Analysis' *43. Jackson had
defended in his essay the existence of epiphenomenal qualia
which
are completely impotent, i.e. qualitative aspects of
subjective experience. To this Watkins reacted in the following
way: 'Beliefs about qualia cannot be justified on the basis of
qualitative
experiences since those experiences do not cause
those beliefs. The only evidence we have of qualia is our direct
experience of them.' Daniel C. Dennett published in 1991 his
'Consciousness explained' after the
formulation by Watkins and
also after a first formulation of this argument by one of us *44.
Although starting from a different philosophy of mind,
functionalism, he shows in a similar way that epiphenomenalism is
incoherent or internally inconsistent, and that for that reason it
does not deserve any serious philosophical attention *45. On page
403 he says literally: : 'So if anyone claims to uphold a
variety of
epiphenomenalism, try to be polite, but ask: What are you talking
about', and on page 405 he concludes: 'There could not be an
empirical reason, then for believing in
epiphenomena. Could there
be another sort of reason for asserting their existence? What sort
of reason? An a priori reason, presumably. But what? No one has
ever offered one
-good, bad, or indifferent- that I have seen.'
According to Stokes (1991) John Foster has stated in a
discussion of the subject that if epiphenomenalism is valid,
anything said by its proponents about mental events would lose its
meaning as there could be no impact of such events on their own
thought and words. In other words, the supposed validity of
epiphenomenalism is self-defeating.
These philosophers have exactly hit the point in our opinion. In
order to clarify this, we will present our own independent
formulation:
(1) Epiphenomenalism uses the concept of consciousness, as it
states that there is such a thing as consciousness, which has got
properties that are not material, etc.
(2) Epiphenomenalism thus holds that its concept of
consciousness refers to a real part of reality, namely to the
(presumably) epiphenomenal but irreducible world of mental
experience.
(3) We have to be aware that even if the concept of
consciousness had been innate, the reality to which it refers
-consciousness- could only be established through introspection,
i.a. by establishing that there are such things as conscious
experiences. Epiphenomenalism starts from the reality of
consciousness and it is based on the (introspective) evidence for
the existence of conscious experiences.
There may be an innate concept of consciousness or not, in any
case epiphenomenalism uses subjective experiences as a touch
stone for such a concept. After all, it is absurd to think that the
reality of something might be established on the basis that we
have a concept of that entity (take for example the case of the
unicorn). The only valid reason for supposing there really are
conscious experiences is therefore the introspective observation
that there are such experiences. If nobody would introspectively
observe subjective experiences, there would be no reason to
suppose that there really would be such a thing as consciousness.
Epiphenomenalism is forced therefore to found its unconditional
acceptance on an introspective contact with that very same
consciousness.
Such a contact, however, equals a causal effect
by consciousness upon the conceptualization processes of the
one that contemplates his or her subjective experiences through
introspection.
By the way, it is not necessary to conceive of the impact of
consciousness in this process as a conscious 'act'. It suffices to
conceive it as a 'factor', comparable to the causal status of an
object perceived during the process of perception *46. In this
respect, we might rephrase Berkeley by saying: 'percipi est
movere' (to be perceived is to move). This view clearly contrasts
with that of David Chalmers (1996) who seems to believe a real
entity can make a difference for our knowledge without at the
same time exerting a causal influence. Chalmers seems to
overlook the fact that in order to have a realistic concept of
something that entity must be somehow represented in memory
(be it mental or neural) which means that the non-causal influence
on knowledge postulated by him must in the end have a really
causal effect after all. Anthony
J. Rudd has successfully defended
(4) Thus epiphenomenalism internally contradicts
experiences, but proclaims at the same time that these
experiences are completely unknowable, by denying them any
causal impact *47. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that
epiphenomenalism should be disqualified for good.
A possible defense by the epiphenomenalists would be at first
sight that in this analytical argument we would encounter a
dubious kind of 'justificationism', as not all theoretical entities must
be justified directly by observations. Is it not enough that the
entities would make a difference for the predictions that follow
from the hypothesis? Perhaps this defense may seem to set the
epiphenomenalist free from the need of founding his or her
certainty that there really is such a thing as subjective awareness.
However, the contrary is true. Even if we would take the case
mentioned seriously, this would still lead us to the conclusion that
consciousness needs to make an impact, even if only indirectly, on
the predictions about reality, and that influence would not be
reconcilable with epiphenomenalism either *48.
Epiphenomenalism turns out to be a kind of obscurantism, an
erroneous representation of (part of) reality in favour of
conceptions that are considered indubitable, i.e. of physicalism
*49, and of the irreducibility of the subjective mind. We might say
that it is a 'refuge' for those physicalists who are not blind to their
own subjectivity *50. The argument described above shows
clearly that physicalism can no longer believe that it is safe from
radical dualistic attacks.
Implications of the disqualification of epiphenomenalism
The disqualification of epiphenomenalism is, as we have just seen,
inevitable. Now, we will give attention to the consequences of the
disqualification of epiphenomenalism. Ray Jackendoff stated in
1989, confronted by our version of the argument from the
justification of the concept of consciousness, that it might be wise
to reconsider the reality of subjective experiences. Dennett has
even a more extreme position. Starting from his own formulation
of our analytical argument, he concludes that no one is conscious,
at least not in the common, 'mysterious' and qualitative sense of
the term *51. Both authors conclude in other words from the
irreconcilability of physicalism and dualism that the concept of
consciousness should be eliminated, i.e. sacrificed to the
protection of indubitable physicalism *52. In fact we might qualify
this as a contemporaneous form of blind and unfounded
dogmatism.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that both thinkers do
not opt anymore for the materialist
identity theory, but directly for
reductionist materialism,
which denies the existence of the
subjective mind. This is so, because the identity theory also holds
that only the so called 'objective' side to the subjective mind, i.e.
the brain (or part of it), would have an objective impact on reality.
However, this is impossible, as we have already seen, because
for the justification of postulating a subjective mind, it is necessary
to believe that subjective mind is efficacious qua subjective mind,
and not only in the so called 'objective', physiological sense, as
identity theory would have it.
Therefore, as
we are not going to imitate the opportunistic denial
of consciousness, we will have to look for another variant with
regards to psychogenical causality within dualism, unless we
would go for
idealism, which is a conception we will not discuss in
this paper.
The disqualification of parallellism
Various authors *53 stress that parallellism and epiphenomenalism
have a lot in common. Both positions state that for each and every
subjective experience there is a physiological correlate. The
difference is, however, that this correlate according to
epiphenomenalism
is the substrate of that experience, whereas
according to parallellism it would only involve a parallel correlate.
Now, parallellism should be disqualified for a similar reason as the
one given against epiphenomenalism, it even is the mirror image
of our analytical argument. Epiphenomenalism cannot reconcile its
certainty that there really is such a thing as a conscious mind with
the implied impossibility of knowing the existence of
consciousness. Parallellism, on the other hand, cannot reconcile
its certainty that there really is a material world with the purported
inability of that world to have an impact on the psyche. In other
words, on the one hand, there would be no doubt according to
parallellism that there is a physical world, but on the other hand it
follows from the supposed parallel and strictly separate causality
that the physical world cannot have any influence upon the
psyche. Thus there is once again a contradiction: We know with
certainty of the existence of physical world, while at the same
time we are certainly incapable of knowing that same physical
world.
Therefore only interactionism is left as the sole possibility *54.
This implies that the acceptance of the existence of irreducible
subjective experiences (apart from the existence of a material
world), or dualism, logically leads to interactionism.
Interactionism
As it seems, intuition was right. We certainly do count as subjetive
beings, we doubtlessly have an impact upon ourselves, upon our
lives and upon our social and physical environment.
Also, axiology and ethics cannot be reduced to biogenical
epiphenomena. In (human) psychology and in ethology and animal
psychology *55, it should from now on be clear that
consciousness is important for experience and behaviour.
Apparently, it is at least a source of conceptualization. Any current
or theory within these sciences that would be fundamentally
irreconciliable with the existence of psychogenic causality, should
be made aware of the untenability of the positions of
epiphenomenalism and parallellism. We are not, to paraphrase
Huxley, 'conscious automata'.
Furthermore, in neuropsychology and psychiatry the point of
departure should be that there really are effects of consciousness
upon processes in the brain. Cerebral
processes are therefore not
the only internal causes of behaviour and experience, but so is
subjective awareness.
A psychiatry that wants to be beneficial cannot limit itself
therefore to a purely physiological treatment.
Finally, the scientific theoretical status of parapsychology (which
almost by definition contrasts with physicalism) is no longer an apriori problem within the framework of interactionism.
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The authors of 'Exit Epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge'
Titus Rivas, MA (psych. &
phil.) (1964) is a graduate of
systematical philosophy and theoretical psychology. His main
fields of theoretical interest include, in alphabetical order: animal
psychology and ethics, axiology, general psychology, metaphysics
and parapsychology. He has published articles about various
topics within these and other domains and a book on parapsychological reincarnation research, "Parapsychologisch onderzoek naar reïncarnatie en leven na de dood".
Hein van Dongen PhD (phil.) (1957)
has been a student of Dutch
litterature and graduated in philosophy at the University of
Amsterdam. One of his responsibilities is that of editor of the
Dutch journal Prana. He has recently published a book, written
together with Hans Gerding titled 'Het voertuig van de ziel', about
the hylic pluralism of the Dutch philosopher J.J.Poortman.
Correspondence should go to: Titus
Rivas, Darrenhof 9, 6533 RT
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
An earlier Spanish version of this paper was published as "Exit
Epifenomenalismo: La
demolición de un refugio" in Revista de
Filosofia
(Universidad de Santiago, Chile), 2001, vol. LVII, 111-129.
The content of the Spanish paper is practically identical to this
English version, the main exception consisting of our present
remarks about the position defended by David Chalmers.
Notes
1. Our thanks go to Rob de Vries, John Beloff, Ray Jackendoff,
Michael Watkins, Anthony J. Rudd and David Chalmers for their advice and
correspondence. Furthermore we are especially grateful to René van Delft, Dick Bierman, Bob van Dorp, Eric de Maeyer and
Esteban Rivas for
comments. Finally we are indebted to Peter
N.J. Diederen Jr. for having put at our disposal his large library.
We also wish to thank Editors Dr. and Dr. Carla Cordua
for their efforts in making the publication of this English version possible.
2. Eccles, 1977, pp. 17-18.
3. Huxley, 1898, pp. 31-38; James, 1891, p. 129. James
also
mentions as other images: foam, aura, or melody. A
contemporary symbol is the small light or buzzing noise in
computers which indicates that they are working, but which does
not
exert any influence upon its functioning. An additional symbol is
that of a shadow.
4.Beloff, 1987, p. 215; Bergson, 1944, p. 40; Hodges & Lachs,
1979, p. 515.
5. See
for example: Van Rooijen, 1985, pp. 379-383.
6. We refer here to parapsychology as the empirical study of
anomalies, in which the possible existene of those anomalous is
not a priori denied and in which the investigation is focussed at the
study of their reality. In other words, we are not talking about the
sociological or psychological study of 'paranormal' experiences
which is based on the
hypothesis that the phenomena are not (or
cannot be) real.
7. Bierman, Van Dongen & Gerding, 1991.
8. Beloff, 1988, p. 217.
9. We hope it is clear that apart from eliminationism we also
discard the various types of identity theory, functionalism and
emergence materialism. In practice all of these positions can from
an ontological point of view be seen here as forms of materialism,
as all of them hold that the mind does not constitute a separate
domain of reality, but that it can be seen -and this sense be
reduced to- an "interior side", "pattern" or
"level" of matter.
However, matter can by definition never be subjective, neither in a
special manifestation of it nor as some kind of mysterious level. As
Karl Popper has shown (p. 81, etc.) the negation of this fact leads
to a pseudo-materialism which really is a kind of idealism, or to a
definitory confusion (a form of obscurantism) in which the term
"matter" comes something like
"reality" so that it cannot fulfill a
distinctive function in the debate any longer.
10. For example according to Leibniz, see Stokes, 1993, p. 45.
11. Jackendoff, 1988, personal communication. Compare this
with: Heymans, 1933, pp. 85, etc.
12. Jackendoff, 1987, pp. 311-317.
13. James, 1891, pp. 136-137; compare: Crane and Mellor,
1990, p. 192. One
of the best passages about this question can
be found in Bolzano, 1970, pp. 86-87 (in our own free translation):
" However, we have to presuppose the existence of immediate
influences [in nature]...
Because if we do not absolutely deny all
mutual influences, if we do not want to maintain, against common
sense, that in the whole of creation there would not be a
necessary coherence between entities anywhere, if
at least we do
no want to do that, then we must admit there also exists some
kind of immediate influence.
Because if such a thing would not exist, how could there be any
indirect influence? However, immediate influences whether they
occur between [ontological] substances that are individual or
between complex objects or between, on the one hand individual
simple entities and on the other hand complex entities,
presuppose in all these cases something incomprehensible."
14. His source for this is "Shorter Oxford English Dictionary".
15. Compare: Roger Penrose, 1989, 527.
16. J. Shaffer, 1965, 100-101.
17. William James, 1891, 138-144.
18. Karl Popper (with Eccles), 1977.
19.
Karl Popper, 72, etc.
20. Compare this also with Roger Penrose, 1989, 528.
21. René Marres, 1985, 161-162. We also refer to the more
recent English translation of the book by Marres from 1989, In
defense of mentalism: A critical review of the philosophy of mind.
22. Ray Jackendoff, 280-283.
23. John Beloff, 1987, 218-225.
24. Personal communication.
25. Beloff, 1987, 220. Even if there had emerged completely new
and still unknown physical principles of the organization of the
brain, we would not expect those hypothetical principles to go
against the physical limitations of that same brain as an organical
(physical) system.
26. Ayer, 1986, 221.
27. Compare: Ian Stevenson, 1987, 228. One might in theory still
imagine spontaneous correlations between physical events and
mental states, which could still be reconciled with
epiphenomenalism.
28. William James, 1986.
29. G. Heymans, G., 1925.
30. Henri Bergson, 1944.
31. H.H. Price, 1940, 363-385.
32. D. Radin, & R. Nelson , 1989, 1499-1541 and also 'Onverklaarbare relaties tussen het bewustzijn en toevalsprocessen'. Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie (1989). See: Bierman, Gerding y Van Dongen.
33. Bierman, Van
Dongen and Gerding, 1992; this book contains
contributions by Brian Josephson and Olivier Costa de
Beauregard, among other scholars.
34. Karl Popper, 81.
35. Rob de Vries, 1991, 10, 2, 75-76.
36.
For a more extensive refutation of this version, see: M.
Hodges en J. Lachs, 1979, 32, 515-529.
37. S. Shoemaker, 1975, 27, 29, etc.
38. A.C. Elitzur, 1989, 10, 9-10.
39. A.C. Elitzur, 9; Compare: Roger Penrose , 1987, 16; Penrose,
1989, 528.
40. Daniel C. Dennett in his already mentioned Consciousness
Explained of 1991.
41.
In fact, the Dutch philosopher René Marres also mentions in
passing the argument of the justification of the concept of
consciousness. However, he speaks of a paradox rather than a
contradiction as he states on page 183 of the
book mentioned
before: "Therefore, an epiphenomenalist cannot hold that his belief
in the existence of mental processes is based on that same
existence." Unfortunately, Marres has clearly underestimated the
value of this argument.
42. F. Jackson, 1982. 43. Michael Watkins, 1989. 44. See the paragraph 'Filosofische kritiek op het fysicalisme' in
the article by Titus
Rivas (1990, pp. 10-11) or his more recent
article (1999).
45. D.C. Dennett, 402-405.
46. The very phenomenon of introspection is in itself necessarily
an act of a conscious subject.
47. There still is another way to demonstrate the logical structure
of the internal inconsistency of epiphenomenalism. Let's suppose
a proposition A which reads: We know of the existence of
subjective experiences (or 'consciousness'). Another proposition B
reads: We cannot know of the existence of subjective
experiences.
Proposition B implies a proposition C, which reads: We do not
know of the existence of subjective experiences. If we substitute
"we know of the existence of subjective experiences" for a
symbol
D, epiphenomenalism can be represented as follows: it holds D
and not-D at the same time, which clearly constitutes a
contradiction.
48. Compare this with Dennett, 1991, 402.
49. The enormous influence that physicalism has on the so called
"hard" natural sciences, can be seen for example in the
following
statement of the famous cosmologist Stephen Hawking: 'We
already know the natural laws that govern everything that we
experience in our daily lives."
50. Compare this with Churchland, 1990, 12: "It's a compromise
between the wish to do justice to a strictly scientific approach to
the explanation of behavior, and the wish to do justice to the
testimony of introspection."
51. Dennett in his 'Brainstorms' of 1979 speaks of "mythical"
where he mentions qualia.
52. In fact, the existence of personal consciousness, of our
subjective inner life, is the only thing that can never be doubted.
Compare: from a logical, analytical point of view it is possible to
doubt that there is a material world (which ultimately may lead to
idealism) or that there are other minds (the ultimate consequence
of which might be solipsism), but it is irrational to doubt that my
own (irreducible) inner of world of subjective and qualitative
experiences is real.
53. For example: Karl
Popper, 72.
54. We won't consider here exactly what interactionist
(sub)theories are superior.
55. The presence of consciousness among animals is probable on the basis of the so called analogy postulate. See: Esteban and Titus Rivas, 1991.
For a follow-up on this argument and reactions to it see "Why the efficacy of consciousness cannot be limited to the mind, by Titus Rivas at
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